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Abstract 
Background: Breakthroughs in animal studies make the topic of human application of ectogenesis for medical 
and non-medical purposes more relevant than ever before. While current data do not yet demonstrate a reasonable 
expectation of clinical benefit soon, several groups are investigating the feasibility of artificial uteri for extracorporeal 
human gestation.
Main text: This paper offers the first comprehensive and up to date discussion of the most important pros and cons 
of human ectogenesis in light of clinical application, along with an examination of crucial ethical (and legal) issues 
that continued research into, and the clinical translation of, ectogenesis gives rise to. The expected benefits include 
advancing prenatal medicine, improving neonatal intensive care, and providing a novel pathway towards biological 
parenthood. This comes with important future challenges. Prior to human application, important questions have to 
be considered concerning translational research, experimental use of human fetuses and appropriate safety testing. 
Key questions are identified regarding risks to ectogenesis’ subjects, and the physical impact on the pregnant person 
when transfer from the uterus to the artificial womb is required. Critical issues concerning proportionality have to 
be considered, also in terms of equity of access, relative to the envisaged application of ectogenesis. The advent of 
ectogenesis also comes with crucial issues surrounding abortion, extended fetal viability and moral status of the fetus.
Conclusions: The development of human ectogenesis will have numerous implications for clinical practice. Prior 
to human testing, close consideration should be given to whether (and how) ectogenesis can be introduced as a 
continuation of existing neonatal care, with due attention to both safety risks to the fetus and pressures on pregnant 
persons to undergo experimental and/or invasive procedures. Equally important is the societal debate about the 
acceptable applications of ectogenesis and how access to these usages should be prioritized. It should be anticipated 
that clinical availability of ectogenesis, possibly first as a way to save extremely premature fetuses, may spark demand 
for non-medical purposes, like avoiding physical and social burdens of pregnancy.
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Background
Several research groups are investigating the feasibil-
ity of generating an artificial uterus [1–5]. A team from 
the University of Eindhoven recently received a €2.9 mil-
lion grant to develop a prototype human artificial womb 
building on these findings [6]. A womb-like environment 
to support extracorporeal gestation is expected to 
advance pre-natal therapy, benefit neonatal intensive 
care, and potentially provide a novel solution for peo-
ple who want to have a child but who are not capable of 
undergoing pregnancy [1, 5, 7–20]. These expected ben-
efits are cited by medical professionals, scientists and 
ethicists alike and are often considered the driving forces 
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Arguments for the production of artificial uteri are also 
made under the heading of promoting reproductive free-
dom and equality among genders and sexual minorities 
[14, 15, 19, 21, 23–32]. Further, it is often suggested that 
artificial uteri could reconcile not ending the life of the 
fetus with the pregnant person’s autonomy to terminate 
pregnancy [15, 25, 33–38].
My aim is to balance these potential benefits against 
future challenges as recent scientific steps add to the 
urgency to explore these questions while the science is 
developing.
Artificial womb technology (AWT) is the common 
concept to describe the technological component of the 
process that is generally called ‘ectogenesis’: i.e. partial or 
complete gestation of a developing embryo or fetus out-
side the human body. Complete ectogenesis, on the one 
hand, means that gestation happens from conception to 
birth completely outside a human body. ‘Partial ectogen-
esis’, on the other hand, can be divided into two interpre-
tations [39]. On one interpretation, ‘partial ectogenesis’ 
refers to the transfer of a partially developed embryo or 
fetus from the female body to an external womb for the 
remainder of the gestation period. On another interpre-
tation, ‘partial ectogenesis’ refers to techniques already 
routinely practiced in neonatology through the use of 
incubators to sustain premature babies, as well as in 
reproductive medicine through, for instance, in vitro fer-
tilization. On this latter reading partial ectogenesis has 
already become a limited reality [14, 34, 39, 40]. I mainly 
focus on the first usage, as this is the area where most of 
the discussion is currently situated. Moreover, as signaled 
by Romanis, the assumption that AWT is an extension of 
current methods in neonatal intensive care may overlook 
morally relevant differences between AWT and current 
practices [41, 42]. Similarly, Murphy has suggested to 
use the term ‘extra corporeal gestation’ (ExCG) instead of 
‘ectogenesis’ or ‘AWT’ to distinguish it from the limited 
ectogenesis in case of current practices. In this article, a 
combination of these concepts will be used [40].
Main text
Ectogenesis: types and state of the art
AWT interest first appeared at the turn of the nineteenth 
century in the writings of Haldane (who coined the term 
‘ectogenesis’). In the 1970s and 1980s this was followed 
by a feminist inspired revival focusing on the liberating 
versus oppressive features of reproductive technology. In 
the early 2000s, there was a reappearance with a certain 
optimism about how AWT could advance fetal surgery 
and provide a controlled milieu for fetal development 
[18, 43, 44].
The current, fourth wave of AWT interest, makes 
the topic more relevant than ever before. The renewed 
interest in ectogenesis today is exemplified by the recent 
breakthroughs in animal studies, of which the EXTEND 
design and the EVE platform are the most important 
cases [4, 5]. Both approaches successfully enabled devel-
opment of lamb fetuses in a sterile environment, using 
extracorporeal perfusion [4, 5, 7, 18, 42, 44, 45]. These 
studies have shown significant improvement of AWT as 
it purportedly moves closer towards clinical application 
in humans, which is as yet an undeveloped technology [2, 
4, 5, 13, 46, 47].
Donated uteri, bioengineered uteri, EXTEND protocol 
and EVE protocol
Ectogenesis can take different forms: ectogenesis and 
AWT do not completely overlap, and research into 
ectogenesis can, but does not necessarily involve tissue or 
bioengineering.
In 1988, Bulletti et al. reported the first in vitro culture 
of a human embryo for 52 h in a hysterectomized human 
uterus (obtained from patients with cervical carcinoma 
or leiomyomas) that was extracorporeally perfused with 
an oxygenated medium [48]. It would raise several ethi-
cal questions if donated uteri are used as an alternative 
to adoption or surrogacy in case of uterine factor infertil-
ity (as has recently been suggested by Bulletti and Simon) 
[9]. Such a scenario would minimally have to grapple 
with issues concerning informed consent for obtain-
ing the uterus, concerns regarding instrumentalization 
of the donor, and questions about who can donate (only 
patients undergoing hysterectomy for medical reasons, 
or healthy donors as well?). The use of living donors in 
the context of uterus transplantations (UTx) has brought 
along similar concerns for the welfare of donors and 
respect for their autonomy, but statements have been 
made that it can be justified if valid and informed consent 
is given by the donor (after thorough counseling); if levels 
of harm are proportionate to the benefits and fall below 
an accepted threshold; and if attempts are made to mini-
mize the use of living donors and any harms inflicted to 
them [49]. A variant of using donated uteri for ectogene-
sis, is so-called xenopregnancy where an embryo or fetus 
is placed inside a uterine carrier belonging to a different 
species [8]. This has been tried in non-human animals. 
As far as safety is concerned, there are at least risks of 
immune rejection of the fetus, inappropriate interactions 
between the fetal trophoblast and the endometrium of 
the carrier and cross-species transfer of infections [8].
In a different kind of venture, researchers are aiming to 
develop uteri through tissue-engineering [9, 10, 50, 51]. 
Organ tissue-engineering is aimed at creating organs 
analogous to native biological organs. This can be done, 
for instance, by creating 3D scaffolds using biomaterials 
or by means of 3D bioprinting [10]. Some advances have 
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been made in attempts to produce organs like the blad-
der, lung, liver and vagina [10]. Knowledge to develop 
artificial uteri through tissue engineering, however, is still 
starting to take off and mainly focused on animal experi-
mentation [10, 50]. Important challenges are the search 
for suited in vitro conditions and appropriate technology 
to regulate important parameters like perfusion pres-
sure and oxygen [50]. The research that is currently being 
undertaken into the development of tissue engineered 
uteri is not presently aimed at enabling ectogenesis, 
however. The benefits of these studies, as mentioned by 
Hellström and colleagues, are in  vitro research applica-
tions (such as endometrial cancer cell studies and drug 
screening applications), and possible future application 
in in  vivo transplantation studies (with the goal of cur-
ing uterine factor infertility) [52]. Similarly, the ultimate 
aim of tissue engineered uteri cited by Campo et  al. is 
the usability in reproductive medicine, not in the form 
of ectogenesis, but by way of transplanting the bioengi-
neered uterus [10]. This does not rule out that research-
ers may in the future continue their efforts to develop 
bioengineered uteri for use in ectogenesis. Bulletti and 
Simon, for instance, have stated that results from this 
field of research “offer hope” to develop an artificial 
uterus that can be used not only for uterine transplan-
tation, but also for ectogenesis [9]. In that event, crucial 
ethical work will be due on questions concerning safety 
and proportionality, liability for fetal harm in case of mal-
functioning bioengineered uteri, justifiability of animal 
tests as part of preclinical development, and the accept-
ability of using (human) biomaterial as a source for the 
artificial scaffolds, including obtainment of informed 
consent if donated cells are used. Some ethical work has 
been done regarding bioengineering and bioprinting in 
general, but the specific perspective of bioengineering 
or bioprinting of uteri remains largely unexplored, espe-
cially when use in AWT is concerned [53, 54].
The most recent successes in ectogenesis, however, are 
being made by employing relatively simple sterile con-
tainers for the fetus, rather than using donated uteri or 
bioengineered uteri [4, 5, 16]. A distinction can be made 
between pump-driven systems and pumpless systems. 
Pump-driven (venovenous) systems use a pump to con-
trol drainage of blood to an oxygenerator. Pumpless (arte-
riovenous) models for oxygenation use the fetus’ heart to 
pump the fetal blood from the umbilical arteries [1, 55]. 
Bird describes both systems as "feasible" and Metelo-
Coimbra and Roncon-Albuquerque conclude that pump-
assisted models "show many advantages" over pumpless 
models [1, 55]. In the past, preclinical animal models 
using pump-driven circuits for perfusion showed success 
in supporting the development of isolated fetuses, but 
this success seems limited when compared to the recent 
though well-documented feasibility of long survival with 
a pumpless extracorporeal system [5, 13, 55, 56].
The current advancements, then, are being made with 
pumpless designs. The state of the art suggests that sub-
stantial departures from the uterine physiology are not 
optimal for clinical application [2]. It has been reported 
that the ideal model for AWT should preferably mimic 
the circulation as it occurs in the intact fetal umbilical-
placental unit, with perfusion determined by fetal car-
diac output [2, 4, 5, 56]. In 2017, an application of the 
EXTEND protocol has resulted in the successful four 
week support of extremely premature fetal lambs, with-
out apparent physiologic derangement or organ failure 
[4]. After making an incision in the uterus, the develop-
ing lambs were held in a closed ‘Biobag’ containing con-
tinuously-circulated synthetic amniotic fluid. In 2019, the 
EVE protocol yielded similar observations, demonstrat-
ing survival of healthy fetal lambs for five days, which 
was purportedly extended to 14  days in a subsequent 
set of unpublished experiments [5, 57]. More recently, 
the latter group kept more immature ewe fetuses for a 
period of nearly five days in an ex vivo uterine environ-
ment (also using a protective bath of artificial amniotic 
fluid), demonstrating normal somatic growth, normal 
cardiovascular performance and absence of infection and 
inflammation [5].
Besides improvements in extracorporeal circuit config-
uration and advances in oxygenator technology, signifi-
cant progress has been achieved both in demonstrating 
the physiological effects of the artificial environment and 
the feasibility of extra-corporeal support of younger ani-
mals biologically comparable to a 22–24-week gestation 
human fetus [4, 5, 13, 16, 46, 55]. It is said that this will 
be the primary clinical target population of AWT as a life 
support platform for extremely preterm infants [4, 5] Yet, 
as hinted at by Sahoo and Gulla, it is likely that if found 
successful, its use may ultimately cover a wider period 
of gestation and possibly also facilitate a wider range of 
applications [47].
Potential applications of ectogenesis
Ectogenesis as neonatal care: decreasing morbidity 
and mortality among extremely premature infants
While there is no evidence that AWT can presently sup-
port extremely preterm fetuses, the eventual translational 
target is to provide a milieu where the fetus can continue 
to develop in a uterine-like environment without physi-
ological stress of preterm birth [1, 5]. Various researchers 
and commentators explicitly state that the aim of AWT 
research is to improve current standards of neonatal care 
by decreasing morbidity and mortality among extremely 
preterm infants who cannot survive with existing neona-
tal intensive care [1, 9, 13, 16]. Existing ventilation-based 
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life support is believed to have reached an efficacy 
threshold, since the structural and functional immaturity 
of the lungs of critically preterm fetuses are incompatible 
with pulmonary gas exchange [4, 57]. To the degree that 
there is a duty to save or improve the prospects for pre-
terms, and assuming that AWT will be convenient to this 
end, this provides reason to develop AWT, particularly 
if this technology is more effective than existing tech-
nologies [41]. Yet, as I will explore below, this expressed 
and (by some) hoped-for progress towards AWT comes 
with ethical concerns about social implications, possible 
undesirable outcomes in terms of offspring welfare, and 
about whether regulation can keep up with the pace of 
the current developments.
There is an ongoing debate about whether or not AWT 
could be framed as a continuation of already existing 
neonatal intensive care. Romanis, for instance, provides 
arguments to differentiate AWT from neonatal intensive 
care (which also relate to her position that subjects of 
ex utero gestation are unique human entities which she 
terms’gestatelings’), though authors like Kingma and Finn 
object that these arguments are insufficient [27, 41, 42, 
58]. Yet, such a framing may have clinical implications, as 
it seems to suggest that it can be introduced as an inno-
vative technology, not as experimental research [42, 59]. 
The experimental use of AWT on preterms will expose 
research subjects to unknown risks and will come with 
concerns about parents-to-be feeling pressured to con-
sent to experimental procedures (see below) [42].
It is worth noting that the proof of concept for partial 
ectogenesis demonstrated by Partridge et  al. and Usuda 
et al. is thus not intended as an alternative to pregnancy 
(viz. complete ectogenesis), but rather as an improvement 
of (and possibly replacement for) neonatal care [4, 5, 60, 
61]. It can reasonably be held that partial ectogenesis 
brings a certain urgency with it as it will be possible long 
before complete ectogenesis [42, 60]. In addition, partial 
ectogenesis impacts the pregnant person, not in the least 
because of the physical translocation of the fetus to the 
artificial womb [60, 62, 63]. An incision is made in the 
uterus—resembling a Caesarean—to expose the fetus, 
after which it is transferred to the sterilized container [2, 
4, 5]. It is likely that this intervention will be no less risky 
than a Caesarean section—with the potential to be sig-
nificantly riskier. Caesareans are a form of major surgery 
and entail possible adverse consequences like risks of 
blood clotting and excessive bleeding, wound infection, 
and in cases of a previous Caesarean there is an expected 
increased risk of obstetric complications (e.g. heightened 
risks of hysterectomy, abnormal placentation, uterine 
rupture) [31, 62–65]. Kingma and Finn recently hypoth-
esized that some of these risks are more likely after par-
tial ectogenesis (as the uterine incision will be done at an 
early pregnancy stage, when the uterus is less stretched 
than in a term pregnancy, the scar may be comparatively 
bigger, thus increasing future risks of uterine rupture, 
abnormal placental implantation, etc.) [27]. This is also 
relevant for the expectation that ectogenesis will advance 
the field of fetal medicine, discussed in the next section.
Advancing fetal medicine and optimizing the fetal 
environment
Several authors suggest that fetal therapy (e.g. certain 
surgical operations) would be easier if it could be done on 
an extrauterine fetus [7, 14, 18, 43, 62, 66–68]. In utero 
fetal treatment entails risks like surgical complications 
for the pregnant person and a risk of rupturing the uterus 
[69, 70]. Some authors have noted, however, that even if 
(partial) ectogenesis could make ex utero fetal therapy 
possible, the transfer of the fetus to the external uterus 
will most likely still require a surgical intervention on 
the person’s body (unless full ectogenesis becomes pos-
sible) [62, 71]. Thus, concerns about the pregnant per-
son’s physical wellbeing still remain. Segers et  al. have 
noted that dominant guidelines in neonatal care often 
urge directive counselling to convince pregnant per-
sons to undergo medical intervention for the benefit of 
viable fetuses [62]. Yet, if ectogenesis pushes the limit of 
viability (i.e. make more or even all fetuses viable) this 
might further reinforce pressures on pregnant persons 
to undergo fetal removal when fetal therapy is advocated 
[35, 39, 47, 62]. Usuda et al. nuanced this by stating that 
it seems unlikely that fetuses much below 20 weeks gesta-
tion could be maintained on an artificial placenta, as this 
would require catheterization of umbilical vasculature 
and possibly compromise the fetal heart [61].
There is a similar expected benefit of ectogenesis in 
terms of fetal wellbeing, not necessarily for facilitating 
fetal therapy, but for optimizing the fetal environment 
by closely monitoring nutrition, temperature, oxygena-
tion etc. This could be welcomed as a way of providing a 
more secure uterine milieu for the fetus, but it may also 
put pressure on pregnant persons to undergo certain 
interventions for the benefit of the future child [14, 60, 
62]. This may especially (but not only) be the case when 
the pregnant person’s behaviour is thought to be wor-
rying, for example because of substance abuse [14, 60]. 
Some fear that a greater knowledge of the fetal develop-
ment through ectogenesis could be used to justify greater 
control on normal pregnancies [32]. If ectogenesis is able 
not only to increase health outcomes for new-borns, 
but also to minimize maternal morbidity and mortal-
ity, natural pregnancy might be considered risky and 
the choice to gestate might become stigmatized, and 
maybe even blameworthy when negative health out-
comes do result [23, 47, 72, 73]. Some authors worry 
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that ectogenesis could therefore oppose the meaning 
that some people find in gestation and childbirth, expos-
ing a conflict between wellbeing of the future child and 
autonomy of the pregnant person [23, 68, 72, 73]. There is 
reason to believe that especially for individuals from dis-
advantaged groups this may lead to increased pressure to 
use ectogenesis to secure the safety of the fetus, which, 
in turn, is a reason to be sceptical about the freedom-
promoting potential of AWT (see below). As Cavaliere 
observes, there is also the additional risk that disadvan-
taged women may be viewed as “substandard gestators” 
compared to AWT, which might exacerbate and entrench 
existing social inequalities [23].
Finally, the possibility to scientifically control the fetal 
growth environment might, according to Tong and Mur-
phy increase the striving for ideal fetuses in ideal milieus 
[44, 74]. A related topic that receives relatively little 
attention is how ectogenesis could make genome editing 
easier in fetuses, both for disease related and non-disease 
related traits [67]. As far as worries about non-thera-
peutic applications are concerned, it may be noted that 
most of these concerns are not new or unique to the 
ectogenesis case. This is not to deny that this covers some 
important questions about autonomy, equity, justice and 
disability discrimination [14, 75].
Enabling biological parenthood
A third, and according to Kendal “perhaps the strongest 
justification for promoting the development of ectogen-
esis” [58], is to offer a new solution to people who wish 
to procreate, but for whom pregnancy is impossible or 
particularly dangerous [8–10, 14, 15, 17, 21, 30]. This 
could help a variety of people, including individuals 
with a damaged (e.g. due to cancer treatment), diseased 
(e.g. due to congenital uterine malformations) or miss-
ing uterus (e.g. due to hysterectomy or uterine agenesis); 
transgender women; single men and gay male couples; 
pregnant people facing health complications who are no 
longer capable of carrying the fetus to term. In all cases, 
except the latter, this would require complete ectogene-
sis, which is highly speculative. Focusing on these appli-
cations therefore engenders expectations that may prove 
to be unrealistic.
The argument to invest in ectogenesis as a way to 
assist procreation in the above groups, would be largely 
based on the value of reproductive autonomy (involv-
ing the right to decide whether to have children, how, 
when, with whom, etc.). More generally in the context of 
assisted reproduction, it has been argued that the value 
of autonomy may indicate that precedence should be 
given to a person’s preferred way of becoming a parent, 
but that redirection towards alternative ways is appropri-
ate if there are good reasons for such a redirection, such 
as safety, cost-effectiveness and equity considerations [76, 
77]. Relatively little attention has been paid to this when 
it comes to ectogenesis as a means of providing a person 
with a child versus alternative means, like adoption, sur-
rogacy and UTx. Interestingly, however, when ectogen-
esis is evaluated under this light, scholars mostly do this 
as part of an argument in favor of ectogenesis over these 
alternatives (and some authors (e.g. [26]) worry that this 
may further stigmatize alternative ways of family build-
ing, like adoption) [9, 19, 28, 30].
First, surrogacy is morally fraught and prohibited in 
several countries. Some of these complications have to 
do with the risk of coercion of the surrogate, liability if 
something happens to the fetus, and the placement of the 
child if intended parents and/or surrogate change their 
minds about raising the child [28, 78]. Second, UTx holds 
safety risks for the fetus, the recipient and the donor (in 
case of live donor surgery) [9, 10, 28, 78]. Other issues 
include the possible exacerbation of black market uterus 
trade, the lack of suitable donor organs and undue pres-
sure on living donors [10, 78]. Positive attitudes towards 
UTx are largely motivated by the value ascribed to carry-
ing a child in the womb—which at least for some seems 
to outweigh the associated risks—but at the same time 
society’s deep association between childbearing and 
femininity has been criticized as placing too high expec-
tations on women to bear children [62, 78, 79]. Devel-
oping UTx to create childbearing opportunities might 
exacerbate these pressures. Adoption, finally, does not 
impose physical risks on the child, the intended parents 
or the donor, but it often is an onerous, costly and emo-
tionally burdensome procedure [78]. Arguments can be 
found that adoption is preferable to ectogenesis, as the 
latter would not produce the social benefits that adop-
tion would [80]. It is questionable, moreover, whether the 
unproven character and expensiveness of ectogenesis as 
‘infertility’ treatment can be outweighed by the benefit 
of preserving the prospect of having a genetically related 
child [80].
In general, the pros and cons of each of these alterna-
tives should be thoughtfully considered and weighed 
against those of ectogenesis.
Non‑medical application: equality and freedom promoting 
potential
One of the most dominant ectogenesis related strands 
is the possible positive effect on women in terms of lib-
eration from reproductive inequalities and the social 
inequalities built on the back of that [14, 15, 19, 21, 23, 
24, 26–32, 74, 81–84] As analyzed by Cavaliere, this view 
consists of two separate, though closely connected argu-
ments: the equality-promoting argument and the free-
dom-promoting argument [23].
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Firstly, the equality-promoting argument largely 
concerns ectogenesis’ potential to increase equality 
between (i) men and women, and (ii) among women [23]. 
Ectogenesis could (i) redress physical, social and financial 
burdens associated with pregnancy and childbirth so as 
to produce more equality between the sexes, but also (ii) 
enable women who are currently unable to gestate chil-
dren to have children in the same way as other women 
who are able to do so [23, 83]. Some scholars extend this 
argument to a broader scope of genders and sexual ori-
entations, like gay men and transgenders [14, 26, 35, 85].
One issue here is whether such use of AWT is undue 
use of obstetric technology [81]. There is, however, no 
clear ethical reason why ectogenesis cannot be used to 
achieve a non-medical goal if that goal is valuable and 
acceptable [81, 86]. Yet, it is not evident that women’s 
exclusive role in the gestation of children is the origin 
of gender inequalities more generally [24, 72, 73, 81]. If 
not pregnancy but other biological gender differences, 
gender roles and/or oppressive social structures are the 
problem, ectogenesis will not resolve gender inequality. 
According to some authors, arguments to use AWT for 
such ends would better be framed as political provoca-
tions, in the sense that ectogenesis talk draws attention 
to current unequal distribution of burdens of gesta-
tion between genders [23, 85]. Other authors have even 
argued that rather than being emancipative, ectogen-
esis would instead reinforce male gendered dominance, 
allowing men to reproduce without women (at least 
in theory) and eventually even lead to "the end of the 
existence of females" [87]. It seems unlikely that AWT 
would lead to the end of either sex, and it appears that 
such arguments should too be read as political provoca-
tions. Further, a crucial, if not the main point, that Cava-
liere makes about these political provocations, is that to 
deliver on the promise to promote equality for all women, 
defenses of ectogenesis need to advance a broad politi-
cal perspective that is not limited to criticism of gender 
inequality, but that also includes concerns about social 
inequalities within the sexes [23]. If the context within 
which ectogenesis is developed and provided is blind to 
inequalities that set higher bars for certain potential ben-
eficiaries to access it (such as members of ethnic minori-
ties, disabled and socioeconomically disadvantaged 
individuals etc.), ectogenesis might actually serve to rein-
force social inequalities.
Secondly, the freedom-promoting argument refers, on 
the one hand, to ectogenesis’ liberative potential from 
burdens, restrictions and risks of pregnancy and child-
birth. On the other hand, it echoes the reproductive 
autonomy argument to show that ectogenesis would ena-
ble people to pursue their preferred parenthood project 
[23]. With ExCG, pregnant people could avoid pregnancy 
(full ectogenesis) or end pregnancy (partial ectogenesis) 
in favor of ex utero gestation to sidestep pregnancy-
related discomforts (e.g. morning sickness, bad moods, 
swollen limbs, migraines, pain of childbirth, depression) 
[17, 30, 83, 88]. Authors like Kendal and Murphy also cite 
social benefits like avoidance of pregnancy related career 
breaks and not having to alter smoking or drinking habits 
[74, 83].
If ExCG becomes clinically available, it is likely that 
there will be demand for such usage (which does not 
imply that ends related to e.g. career advancements 
should be taken as something that is desired without 
exception [23]). Yet, as noted by Romanis, access to 
obstetric technology is presently mainly medically con-
trolled, which goes against offering ex utero gestation 
without medical cause [17, 60]. The high cost of AWT 
is also cited as an obstacle for using it as a way to avoid 
these so-called ‘minor’ discomforts [17, 61]. Kendal, on 
the other hand, defends state sponsored access to AWT 
for everyone and for all pregnancy-related discomforts, 
since the technology’s being accessible only to those 
who are able to pay for it might make the gaps of socio-
economic inequality deeper [83]. State-covered access to 
ectogenesis, however, would take away scarce resources 
for other competing purposes, which would be prob-
lematic if everyone who could benefit from the technol-
ogy would be eligible for reimbursement, knowing that 
pregnancy always carries with it physical, social and eco-
nomic burdens, and a risk of injury.
Importantly, prioritization decisions are not limited 
to resolving which particular treatments should (not) 
be funded. As noted above, access to reproductive tech-
nology is structured by power relationships that raise 
respective (reproductive) justice concerns about cultural 
barriers that disadvantaged groups may experience [23, 
73]. For AWT to live up to its freedom-promoting poten-
tial, much will depend on the conditions under which 
the technology becomes available [23]. This comes with 
normative questions about who from the eligible patient 
population deserves priority, and what values are mobi-
lized to account for such decisions.
In general, decisions about the accessibility of ExCG 
(for various groups of people and for diverse reasons) 
should be the subject of a democratic debate, based on 
sound argumentation. Authors who are skeptical about 
the freedom and equality promoting argument assert that 
such considerations should at least also take into account 
possible effects on the future child’s welfare, societal 
inequities and, in case of partial ectogenesis, the innate 
risks of preterm extraction of a fetus for ex utero gesta-
tion [17, 66, 73]. For these reasons, it is argued that ExCG 
would be less acceptable for social considerations and 
for lesser discomforts, than for e.g. cases of dangerous 
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pregnancy or as a form of neonatal intensive care [17]. 
Taking account of the multitude of possible applications 
of AWT and setting consistent eligibility criteria with 
attention to possible roadblocks that people may face as 
potential users, are among the most important challenges 
for organizing fair access to this technology.
Social implications: abortion, fetal viability, fetal 
termination
The above indicates that ectogenesis may have impor-
tant implications for human reproduction and gestation 
that go beyond a strict medical focus [39]. As noted by 
Schoberer et  al., the transgressing nature of ectogenesis 
and the way in which it diverts from pregnancy as we 
know it, might hamper the social acceptance of ectogene-
sis [89]. Relatedly, Simonstein and Mashiach-Eizenberg’s 
study of public perspectives on ectogenesis indicated that 
the use of AWT was found much more acceptable if it is 
aimed at survival of extremely preterm fetuses and ena-
bling motherhood in case of absolute uterine factor infer-
tility, than it is to discharge women from the burdens of 
pregnancy [90].
Public consultations teach us little about how we 
should evaluate developments like AWT, but they do 
offer important information about how the public val-
ues such advancements and how/whether this keeps 
pace with new scientific and ethical developments and 
insights, which can help organize a dialogue on those top-
ics. The most recent empirical work on ectogenesis is the 
study by Di Stefano et al. who surveyed a sample of Aus-
tralian obstetricians and neonatologists [36]. The authors 
reported ambivalence among professionals about the 
desirability of ectogenesis and mixed views on whether it 
should become common practice to save extremely pre-
mature fetuses. Professionals also expressed uncertainty 
as to whether ectogenesis should result in restrictions in 
access to abortion [36].
There is a currently ongoing debate about how ectogen-
esis might affect the acceptability and regulation of abor-
tion. Some authors believe that ectogenesis could provide 
a more acceptable alternative to abortion by separating 
two currently inseparable events: the evacuation of the 
fetus from the womb and the death of the fetus [19, 29, 
38, 91]. Singer and Wells famously stated that this could 
mean the end of abortion as we know it, for they consider 
the right to abortion as a right to be free of unwanted 
pregnancy, not as a right to the death of the fetus [19]. 
More recently Simkulet concurred that this alone is a 
reason for antiabortionists to pursue ectogenesis tech-
nology [38].
Against this several reasons can be given why ectogen-
esis might complicate rather than end the abortion issue 
[92]. First there is some indication that women, regardless 
of their personal views on abortion, may be unsympa-
thetic to ectogenesis as a ‘solution’ to abortion [34]. Can-
nolds fieldwork suggests that there may be a gap between 
how theoretical positions have considered ectogenesis 
as a solution for the abortion debate, and how women 
actually see this [34]. A major objection to abortion for 
women who were anti-abortion was the assumption that 
a ‘good mother’ accepts responsibility for the care of her 
fetus/child, which does not match with having it brought 
to term in an artificial womb and putting it up for adop-
tion afterwards. Many pro-choice women demonstrated 
a similar concept of maternal responsibility, reporting 
that ectogenesis and adoption would leave them with a 
lingering sense of obligation toward the future child, 
while abortion would be a form of motherhood preven-
tion. In interpreting these results, caution is in order due 
to the small, unrepresentative nature of the sample, the 
risk of making anachronous extrapolations, and the dif-
ficulty of full appeal to empirical findings in assessing 
emerging technology. Still, Cannolds work may indicate 
that abortion is often sought as a means to prevent moth-
erhood, and, more specifically, self- or socially imposed 
attributional parenthood [34, 93, 94].
Some have argued that the harms of attributional par-
enthood may constitute a moral justification for killing 
the fetus and others have argued that it is a reason for 
recognizing a right to the death of the fetus [37, 91, 95–
97]. This argument has been subject to substantial criti-
cism (ranging from objections that someone who already 
is a biological parent cannot have the right not to become 
a biological parent, to comments that it is unclear that 
the alleged harm of attributional parenthood is suffi-
ciently great [98, 99]). I can only explore this issue super-
ficially here, though one of the most solid objections is 
provided by Mathison and Davis (who offer an analogy 
with surrogacy, gamete donation, and adoption), stat-
ing that in analogous cases we do not typically think that 
such alleged harm entails particular further rights for a 
biological parent [100, 101]. Other arguments in favor 
of a right to the death of the fetus include the assumed 
right to genetic privacy and the assumed property right 
of the genetic parents over the embryo/fetus. As regards 
the former, there is unclarity about what it means to have 
a right to genetic privacy. The most plausible under-
standing is one in terms of protection from misuse of 
our genetic material, though that raises the question why 
ectogenesis paired adoption would imply misuse of one’s 
genetic material, and if so, whether that entails a right to 
the death of the fetus [98–101]. Also, the property rights 
argument—which rests on the controversial premise that 
the fetus is property of the genetic parents—faces diffi-
culties, for even if it is granted that they do own the fetus, 
it does not ipso facto follow that the genetic parents can 
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have it terminated [98–101]. I can merely outline some 
of these most central arguments to this discussion on 
the right to the death of the fetus [102, 103]. This debate 
is ongoing and the idea that pregnant people would be 
morally compelled to use AWT rather than seek termina-
tion of the fetus is far from settled [104].
This is complicated further by the fact that early stage 
abortion differs considerably from, and involves less risk 
than, carrying a fetus until it can surgically be transferred 
to an artificial uterus [80, 104, 105]. Cohen has suggested 
that the more invasive the transfer surgery, the stronger 
the claim not to be forced to undergo it, which is possi-
bly backed by the right to refuse treatment [106]. Also, 
in countries where no legal personality is bestowed upon 
the fetus inside the patient’s womb, the stronger point 
can be made that the legal right to bodily autonomy and 
bodily integrity of the party possessing legal person-
hood—here: the pregnant person—should be respected 
and upheld, even if the surgery in question turns out to 
be minor (this is not a settled issue however, as illus-
trated by the pervasive disagreement on the justifiability 
of forced caesareans; see e.g. [107]) [108, 109]. Moreover, 
if fetal extraction to an artificial womb could eventually 
become physically equivalent to early stage abortion, 
autonomy and reproductive freedom of the pregnant 
individual would, however, still be impacted [104]. This 
goes beyond bodily autonomy, because a (reductive) 
focus on abortion as a means to end pregnancy, and the 
respective plea for ectogenesis paired adoption in lieu of 
abortion, may overlook the possible autonomy violation 
in denying people the choice not to have children [104].
Further, in case of full ectogenesis and when a fetus is 
developing in an ectogenetic incubator, it has been said 
that both parents will have an equal say on ending the 
fetus’ life (if the right of termination survives, that is), 
since the main difference between them—the gestational 
burden of the pregnant person—would be levelled out 
[22, 35, 106, 110, 111]. Important questions then include 
whether either parent could, on the basis of negative 
reproductive rights, choose to have an ectogenetic fetus 
terminated, whether one parent would need the consent 
of the other parent or the state to do so, and whether the 
action of ‘switching off the machine’ would be subject to 
abortion laws [110, 111].
Another issue concerns viability. Since ectogenesis 
might push the limit of viability lower, abortion could 
become impermissible under legislations that tie abor-
tion rights to the standard of viability [35, 47, 105, 106, 
110, 112]. ‘Viability’ is open to multiple interpretations 
[62, 112]. Yet, as marked by Abecassis, many judges inter-
pret the term in a broad sense, acknowledging that via-
bility largely depends on the existing technical advances 
[110]. It is speculated that AWT will render embryos and 
fetuses technically viable from conception, if this tech-
nology can successfully support their development in 
an ectogenetic incubator [105, 110]. Yet, as noted above, 
scientists temper this view arguing that it seems unlikely 
that fetuses much below 20 weeks could be maintained in 
an artificial womb [61].
Finally, it can be noted that in the context of ectogenesis 
several authors avoid taking a stand on the moral status 
of the fetus, even though there is a rather wide scope of 
literature available on the moral status of the fetus more 
generally and its implications for abortion [113–115]. An 
important exception is the correspondence between Col-
grove and Romanis [41, 58, 116, 117]. Colgrove’s argu-
ment holds that subjects of partial ectogenesis “are a type 
of newborn” (maintaining that common definitions of 
‘live birth’ actually seem to apply to these subjects), that 
they share the same moral status, and thus deserve the 
same moral treatment as newborns. The argument con-
tinues that subjects of complete ectogenesis cannot be 
identified as newborns (definitions of ‘live birth’ do not 
apply here), but that they do share the same moral sta-
tus as newborns.1 While Colgrove concludes that what-
ever protections apply to newborns should be extended 
to ectogenetic subjects, there is ongoing discussion—and 
rightfully so—of appropriateness of definitions in this 
context (e.g. describing the expulsion of the fetus from 
the uterus to the artificial womb as ‘being born’ seems to 
disregard that emergence of that entity from the process 
of gestation is a crucial criterion of a definition of ‘live 
birth’ that is not completely met by such a fetal transfer) 
[41, 58, 116–118]. Moreover, as explicated by Romanis, 
assigning a moral status does not in itself entail how enti-
ties should be treated [58]. She writes: “once the status 
is assigned we must then make moral judgements about 
whether that status justifies certain treatment” [58]. For 
that reason, addressing moral status may not be such an 
urgent issue, or at least much less pressing than practical 
problems such as how to select research participants for 
innovative technology [58].
Psychology: the impact of ectogenesis on child and parent
One of the oldest concerns about ectogenesis is the 
worry that it may be psychologically harmful, with 
most of the attention going to the possible impact on 
children born through ectogenesis. Nearly one hundred 
years ago, Vera Brittain rejected ectogenesis claiming 
that natural gestation is essential for children, regard-
less of whether or not it is essential for mothers [44, 
119]. This worry was repeated by Singer and Wells and 
1 To make this point Colgrove invokes a hypothetical scenario that is to 
show that there is no reason to assume that subjects of complete and partial 
ectogenesis are unequal in some morally relevant way.
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is still rather dominant [19]. The focus largely remains 
the child’s psychological and emotional development, 
though somewhat more attention has been paid lately 
to the psychological impact on the adult who would not 
have the sensory experience of pregnancy in the case 
of ectogenesis. For instance, some pregnant women 
develop, what Sander-Staudt calls, a relational psy-
chology through talking or singing to their fetus as a 
result of a kick or a turn [120]. Sander-Staudt refers to 
stimulation of contractions and milk flow as a result of 
physical and emotional sensations (also see ref. 122). 
On these grounds, Sander-Staudt raised the question 
whether the use of AWT might lead to “an increased 
biological, emotional, and physical distance between 
mothers and children, and hence to society in general” 
[120].
There is some understanding that a pregnant person’s 
oxytocin level may significantly promote expression of 
maternal behavior after birth [121]. The physical sensa-
tion of gestating may also play a role in the development 
of this bond, which has been used as an argument in 
favor of UTx. This argument for UTx is used despite the 
absence of pelvic nerve connections [62, 78, 122]. There 
is also no accumulated knowledge about long-term psy-
chological effects of UTx on parents and future children 
[123]. On the other hand, Golombok et al. indicated that 
absence of a gestational link between parents and their 
child does not seem to have a negative impact on the 
psychological well-being of parents [124]. Moreover, con-
cerns about the dependency of a mother’s bond on physi-
cally gestating her child are disarmed by experiential 
knowledge about good parent–child relationships among 
step- and adoptive parents, and father-child relationships 
[31].
Yet, this seems to lose sight of the fact that these sce-
narios differ from ectogenesis, in the sense that here the 
child has been gestated by someone, while ectogenesis is 
unprecedented in that there is no or only a partial ges-
tational relationship between the child and a person by 
whom it is gestated [111, 120]. Because children have 
always developed in utero, it is hard to predict whether 
and how this will affect the psychological and relational 
potential of the child developed in an AWT. Sander-
Staudt warns that if those children miss out on stimuli 
that are preconditions for human affection and intimacy, 
this could have serious psychological implications [111, 
120]. We do not know just how much a child’s psychol-
ogy is impacted by being gestated in utero, but consid-
eration must be given to how isolation from the uterine 
milieu—including the pregnant person’s voice, moods, 
heartbeat and touch—might adversely affect the child’s 
emotional and neuropsychological development [89, 
105, 120]. At the same time, ectogenesis may actually 
offer more opportunities to interact with the fetus before 
birth, especially for the father.
Some authors believe that this suggests that research 
into ectogenesis should aim “as much as possible to sim-
ulate other features of organic gestation besides mere 
minimal physical components of nutrition and waste 
removal” [120]. This poses significant epistemological 
obstacles: the psychological effects of ectogenesis on a 
human fetus cannot entirely be obtained from data in the 
animal model [19, 89, 120]. In addition, laboratory obser-
vations in the human model would only seem to yield 
insightful results if the experiment is allowed to run until 
the child is born, and thus possibly exposing it to harm 
[125]. The extent of the risk of psychological harm is hard 
to determine, and at this stage of the research it seems 
to be impossible to assess whether any such harm could 
outweigh the benefits of ectogenesis. Future research 
will have to explore how this can be evaluated through 
responsible experimentation and longitudinal studies.
Future perspectives: safety, animal experimentation, 
human testing, follow‑up
Further dissemination of AWT-related research can rea-
sonably be expected, but there are important hurdles that 
need to be overcome prior to clinical translation. In light 
of the recent achievements in the animal model, some 
commentators have prophesized that these technological 
and theoretical advances will soon make AWT in humans 
a clinical reality [126]. Yet, interestingly, the researchers 
of the EVE protocol have recently signaled that introduc-
tion to the clinic in the near future would be extremely 
premature [13, 61].
Safety is one of the most important reasons. Some 
critical technical and scientific issues are related to the 
inherent spasticity of umbilical vessels, the limited scope 
of placental functions that current models in AWT can 
perform, the determination and administration of appro-
priate nutrition and hormones, the monitoring of organ 
development (including lung and brain maturation), the 
functionality and placement of catheters in the fetus, the 
stability of the circuit flow (and the related issue of dos-
ing paralytics to minimize fetal movement that limits 
circuit flow), and, importantly, the significant difference 
between ovine-based model systems and human models 
[2, 55].
This latter concern is one important reason not to be 
over-confident about the expected application of AWT 
in humans soon. As noted by Sahoo and Gulla, the dif-
ferences in the development of the fetal lung and brain 
in ewes compared to humans may have led to favorable 
outcomes in the animal model, indicating that the same 
result might not be replicated in human fetuses [47]. The 
current animal data and the substantial physiological 
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differences between the test animals and humans do not 
demonstrate a reasonable expectation of clinical benefit 
yet [42].
Testing on animals with physiologies more similar 
to humans has been suggested [42]. Yet, this is morally 
controversial, especially when non-human primates are 
used. Ethical work will have to be done to evaluate and 
balance the moral cost of such research procedures in 
terms of compromised animal welfare versus the moral 
benefits of ectogenesis research [127]. For instance, the 
ethical evaluation of animal testing for the development 
of partial ectogenesis to ameliorate morbidity and mor-
tality among extreme preterms is likely to differ substan-
tially from the ethical assessment of such procedures to 
develop full ectogenesis to avoid burdens of pregnancy. 
Moreover, authors like Schultz for instance, are skeptical 
that no matter how far the science is perfected in the ani-
mal model, a standard of ‘reasonable assurance’ of safety 
in humans cannot be met [29].
Safe clinical use of human ectogenesis will, then, 
require extensive research on human subjects as well, 
including embryos and fetuses, which is rife with contro-
versy. To test partial ectogenesis, Alghrani and Brazier 
have suggested the use of human fetuses that are con-
ceived and gestated (for a limited period of time) in utero, 
but where the pregnant person is about to go into pre-
mature labor, or when the pregnant person’s health and/
or that of the fetus requires that delivery is initiated at a 
stage when conventional neonatal care offers little hope 
of survival for the baby [128]. The acceptability of such a 
research trial is largely underexamined. Central questions 
that have to be considered here are the validity of the 
future parents’ consent and whether such a trial can be 
regarded as therapeutic research at all [42, 128]. When, 
in that case, the parents-to-be consent to such a trial for 
the sake of the intended benefit of the child, one will have 
to consider whether this can be said to be in the future 
child’s interest, taking account of the possibility that via-
bility may come at the cost of severe disability. The exper-
imental use of AWT on preterms will not only expose 
research subjects to unknown short- and long-term risks, 
but it will also come with concerns about the validity of 
parental consent in such emotionally challenging and 
distressing circumstances [42, 128]. Alghrani and Brazier 
mention that it may be hard to obtain such consent, for 
instance because people may prefer to let the child “die in 
peace” when they are informed that their child is highly 
likely to die or be severely disabled in case (s)he survives 
the procedure [128]. Parents-to-be may also feel pres-
sured to consent, so adequate and understandable infor-
mation should be offered about the risks and benefits, the 
alternatives and the purpose of the research [42].2 In this 
context, awareness of the so-called therapeutic miscon-
ception should be addressed, because willingness to con-
sent might be due to expectations that the experiment 
will offer the best health outcomes for the child (which 
is doubtful) [42]. It is unlikely that parents of premature 
children with good or even mediocre prospects of sur-
vival through traditional neonatal care would volunteer 
for such experiments, leaving only fetuses with dire pros-
pects, which are least likely to result in healthy babies. 
Another possible source might be the use of fetuses when 
a decision has been taken to abort [128]. Important ques-
tions here are whether persons who want to end their 
pregnancy can authorize use of the fetus for ectogenesis 
research. There will be a significant risk of fetal death or 
injury, yet, as noted by Alghrani and Brazier, the purpose 
of such research is the fetus’s survival, and slim though 
the chance may be now, if it survives, one will have to 
confront the question whether in that case it can be killed 
[128]. A third option, which is especially relevant for test-
ing complete ectogenesis, is the direct implantation of an 
embryo into an ectogenetic incubator where it is com-
pletely gestated. This would probably result from moving 
boundaries at both ends of the prenatal spectrum. That 
is, on one end, the possibility to extend human embryo 
culture and, on the other end, the growing ability to keep 
preterms alive. In combination with AWT, this might 
enable to span pregnancy completely ex  vivo. Here, the 
use of spare IVF embryos might be thought of, though 
it should be noted that almost every country that allows 
embryo research upholds the so-called 14-day rule, which 
stipulates that embryos should not be grown in vitro for 
longer than 14 days after fertilization. Scientific develop-
ments like extended culture systems for in vitro embryos 
are now provoking suggestions to revise this rule, but the 
technical feasibility of extending the time span for keep-
ing embryos in vitro does not in itself entail the norma-
tive conclusion that this would be acceptable [14, 30, 
130–132]. Ethical discussion and democratic debate will 
be necessary to evaluate whether the instrumental use 
and longer culture of embryos are proportionate to the 
goals of ectogenesis (both full and partial).
Lastly, the issue of how much safety testing is required 
is a recurring discussion in reproductive contexts and it 
is not unique to the case of ectogenesis that possible risks 
to future offspring are weighed against other values [133]. 
Singer and Wells, for instance, stated that ectogenesis 
must not go forward until researchers are confident that 
the procedure will do “no, or at least, very little,” harm to 
2 Similar reflections about consent and accurate information about the cur-
rent state of knowledge of risks and benefits have been made in the context of 
UTx. See [129].
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future generations [19]. These are contentious notions, 
that should at least be actualized in the light of pres-
ently known risk factors. While it has been noted that 
AWT ‘does not have to be perfect’ because pregnancy 
is not perfect either, the involvement of clinical profes-
sionals does, however, come with additional role respon-
sibilities [84, 134]. It should also be noted that concerns 
about the offspring’s wellbeing are complicated by philo-
sophical arguments that it is only morally wrong to bring 
a child into existence by means of a risky technology if 
that child’s life will be so bad that it would be better for 
the child not to live. Yet, this argument does not reflect a 
consensus position among philosophers and bioethicists 
as it sets the bar for reproductive risk taking at a very low 
level [135]. The future child’s wellbeing is regarded as an 
important moral concern, also if it is above the ‘wrong-
ful life’ standard, implying that the ‘good’ that is suppos-
edly done by bringing someone into existence does not 
necessarily trump the harm that is inherently linked to 
that same act. Where the bar of the future child’s welfare 
should be set is contested, though several guidelines exist. 
The ‘reasonable welfare threshold’, for instance, holds that 
medical professionals should not offer technology if pres-
ently known risk factors foreshadow a high risk that the 
future child would have a seriously diminished quality 
of life [136].3 This requirement, including the stipulation 
that physicians carry joint responsibility for the welfare 
of the child due to their “causal and intentional contribu-
tion to the parental project”, is said to apply to all medi-
cal interventions enabling procreation, which reasonably 
also includes AWT [136]. It is an open question if/when 
the use of AWT could meet this reasonable welfare prin-
ciple. In the meantime, more debate on the threshold for 
acceptable risk in this context is desirable—with an active 
role for multiple stakeholders, including ethicists, profes-
sional societies and patient organizations [134].
For now, it is important to observe that scientists and 
ethicists have stressed that there is as yet no clinical evi-
dence supporting experimental AWT in humans [42, 61]. 
Caution is due and eventual clinical introduction should 
happen in a limited and closely monitored trial, with fol-
low-up starting during pregnancy and continuing after 
birth, yet also here issues of privacy and informed con-
sent will have to be taken into account. AWT in humans 
is as yet not to be welcomed as an innovative treatment 
(let alone as an established technology), but rather as an 
experimental procedure [59]. Uncertainty should be fur-
ther reduced through preclinical studies using animals 
and, if this is found to be proportionate, it should be stud-
ied whether and how involvement of human embryos 
can be managed during this research stage [134]. When 
all conditions of experimental research can be fulfilled, 
strict indications can be defined for managing AWT as 
an innovative procedure, with specific restrictions aimed 
at reducing avoidable risks in the application of the rel-
evant technology. Here the testing of AWT as an alterna-
tive to conventional methods of neonatal intensive care 
might be a possibility [59, 134]. Long-term follow-up will 
have to be central in this innovation strategy, which will 
require the continuing consent first of the parents but 
then also of the maturing child [66, 137]. Especially for a 
technology like AWT where there may be complications 
in terms of organ development and regulation of crucial 
parameters like oxygen and nutrition, there should be a 
continuous follow-up with strict feedback when irregu-
larities are noticed. Harmful outcomes on their physi-
cal as well as mental health may only become apparent 
after birth, and long-term follow-up will be important 
to minimize risks to future children born via AWT [66]. 
It is presently unclear how long participant data collec-
tion should be conducted post ectogenetic birth. Singer 
and Wells have suggested a follow-up period of six years, 
though this suggestion is not particularly substantiated 
and more elaborate reflections are required [125]. One 
may draw here upon similar discussions from the con-
text of UTx, where an international registry has been 
announced to determine the long-term safety of the 
procedure. Apart from questions about the duration of 
follow-up—the United States Uterus Transplant Consor-
tium recommends a minimum of 5 years of follow-up of 
medical, cognitive, developmental, behavioral and social 
parameters—crucial challenges with respect to auton-
omy, consent, privacy and welfare of participants are 
being discussed [129, 138]. Debates about how to manage 
trade-offs between the protection of personal informa-
tion of participants and the interests of future beneficiar-
ies of UTx may inform the future clinical introduction of 
AWT [129]. This also includes questions about how to 
obtain appropriate and ongoing consent, as well as con-
cerns about difficulties with data anonymization due to 
the small pool of beneficiaries, which may also be the 
case for AWT due to the recommended gradual roll-out 
of the technology [129]. Further dissemination of AWT 
should only be allowed in case of established results that 
reassure safety and effectivity. An important considera-
tion throughout these research phases, as well as when 
this technology becomes clinically available, is the ques-
tion of liability for potential injuries during the gestation 
in the ectogenetic incubator [29, 47].3 This is the intermediate standard between the minimal ‘wrongful life’ stand-
ard and the ‘maximal welfare’ standard. The latter rejects all medical interven-
tions with indications that the life conditions of the future child will not be 
optimal [136].
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Conclusions
AWT could improve neonatal intensive care, provide 
an alternative for surrogacy or uterus transplantation, 
advance pre-natal therapy, remedy gender inequity and 
enable termination of pregnancy without terminating 
the life of the fetus. Prompt clinical introduction, how-
ever, is unlikely given the many concerns for the welfare 
of children born through AWT. Crucial work remains 
to be done regarding whether and how experimentation 
on (which) human subjects could be organized without 
crossing an acceptable threshold of risk and with rig-
orous follow-up during pregnancy and continuing after 
birth, with due respect for privacy and informed con-
sent. Experimental use of AWT will expose research 
subjects to unknown risks, both physical and psycho-
logical, and entail concerns about the possibility of con-
senting to such procedures.
In setting conditions of experimental research, clear 
indications will have to be defined to determine accept-
able application of the technology. AWT will primarily 
be used as a life support platform for extremely preterm 
infants, though it is likely that its eventual use may ulti-
mately cover a wider period of gestation and possibly 
facilitate a wider range of applications.
In case of partial ectogenesis, the transfer of the fetus 
to the ectogenetic incubator will impact the pregnant 
person, meaning that respective concerns about physi-
cal wellbeing and autonomy still remain. If AWT would 
ever be used to advance fetal therapy, this might com-
plicate the possible conflict between the beneficence 
towards the future child and the autonomy of the preg-
nant person.
AWT as a new solution for people who wish to pro-
create, but for whom pregnancy is impossible or risky, 
is largely based on the value of reproductive autonomy. 
This lays out the importance of balancing the pros and 
cons of other parenthood alternatives against those of 
ectogenesis. Considerations in terms of safety, cost-effec-
tiveness and equity of access will be key. Given the multi-
tude of possible applications—including the possibility to 
sidestep lesser pregnancy discomforts and related social 
burdens—setting consistent eligibility criteria will be 
one of the most important challenges for organizing fair 
access to AWT. Finally, societal debate is due about the 
impact of ectogenesis on the acceptability and regulation 
of abortion. Contrary to common assertions, ectogenesis 
might complicate rather than settle the abortion issue.
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